In Re: Atty. Fernando Arguelles Jr. vs Maj. Balajadia

In Re: Atty. Fernando Arguelles Jr. vs Maj. Balajadia Jr.

G.R. No. 167211

March 14, 2006

Facts:

  The Senate Committee scheduled a hearing on March 15, 2005 at 10:30 a.m. to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, regarding the alleged illegal sale of unregistered and high risk securities by the Standard Chartered Bank.

 The officers of Standard Chartered Bank were subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Committee hearing scheduled on March 15, 2005. At the hearing, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo were present as their counsel.

The minutes of the hearing show that Standard Chartered Bank’s counsel provided the Senate Committee with a copy of the petition for prohibition. The bank’s counsel also filed an urgent motion to suspend or defer the proceedings of the Senate Committee apparently to await the action of the Court on the petition for prohibition.

During the hearing, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile declared that “there is one portion of this petition that casts a slur on this Committee and the proceedings of the Committee.”  He asked Paul Simon Morris, Chief Executive Officer of the Standard  Chartered Bank, who verified the petition for prohibition, whether he endorsed this allegation, thus:      

THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY ‘IN AID OF LEGISLATION,’ BUT IN REALITY IN AID OF COLLECTION OF A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS OF THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK FOR LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND RISK WHICH COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE.^[1]

Morris admitted that he endorsed the allegation that the investigation was “in aid of collection” upon the advice of their lawyers.  He stated that he acted in good faith, and apologized for his error of judgment.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile moved to cite the officers of Standard Chartered Bank and their counsel, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, for contempt for making the allegation.

The Senate Committee took two breaks and resumed at 12:00nn. Senator Edgardo Angara, Chairperson of the Senate Committee, issued an Order directing respondent Major General Jose Balajadia, Jr., sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, to detain for direct contempt of the Committee the officers of Standard Chartered Bank and their counsel, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, for a period of not more than six hours.

  The  persons who were  detained in a room at the Senate then filed this petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the Committee acted in violation of the Constitution and without jurisdiction. They reasoned that any comment on, or criticism of, the conduct of the Committee is protected by freedom of expression  as guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the Constitution

   On March 18, 2005, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that they were released from the custody of the Senate by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms on March 15, 2005 at 5:56 p.m. Notwithstanding their release, petitioners submitted that it is imperative that the issues involved in this case be resolved, because they are of unprecedented and transcendental importance and they involve the impact of the exercise of the powers of Congress upon human rights.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not filing of Petition for habeas corpus is still necessary.

RULING:

           

No. The Petition has become moot.

The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.  Petitioners have been released.  The SC ruled that while the issues raised by petitioners are important, it is not appropriate to resolve them now in these proceedings.    This is all the more so considering that the only respondent here is Maj. Gen. Jose Balajadia, Jr., the Senate sergeant-at-arms, impleaded in that capacity for holding petitioners in custody.  The Senate Committee itself has not been made a respondent and, therefore, has not been given the opportunity to be heard on the issues sought to be resolved.   

Quimsing vs Tahanglangit

Quimsing vs Tahanglangit

G.R. No. L-19981            

February 29, 1964

FACTS:

                On May 20, 1960, Godofredo Quimsing was designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City. On December 20, 1961, and while such incumbent of the office, he was extended by then President Garcia an ad-interim appointment to the same position. Quimsing took his oath of office before the City Mayor of Iloilo on December 28, 1961, and continued discharging the functions of Chief of Police of said city.

At the session of the Commission on Appointments on May 16, 1962, the appointment of Quimsing, among others was confirmed. On the following day, however, at the session of said body , Senator Puyat moved for the reconsideration of all appointments previously confirmed, manifesting at the same time that said "motion for reconsideration be laid on the table." Furthermore, he moved for the adjournment of the session of the Commission sine die. There being no objection, said motion was approved and the session was adjourn.

On June 11, 1962, President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City and the latter took his oath and tried to discharge the functions of the office on June 13, 1962. On July 12, 1962 Quimsing filed a petition for prohibition to restrain Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo to which petitioner allegedly had previously been appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he was actually discharging.

Tajanglangit, in his answer, claimed among others, that petitioner's ad-interim appointment was a nullity in view of the President's Administrative Order No. 2, withdrawing, cancelling, or recalling ad-interim appointments extended after December 13, 1961; and that the alleged confirmation of petitioner's ad-interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments did not also produce any effect, because the same had been the subject of a motion for reconsideration and no further action has been taken on said appointment until the present time.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not appointment of respondent Eduardo Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City valid.

RULING:

                No. The SC ruled that the appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of IloIlo City is nul and void.

                The motion of Senator Puyat, for reconsideration of the confirmations made the day before, among which was herein petitioner's, was coupled with prayer, not for a resubmission of said appointments anew, but for the laying of the motion (for reconsideration) on the table. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, the "laying on the table" of the motion shall be the final disposition thereof. In other words, no further action need be taken by the Commission thereon. It is as if no motion for reconsideration was filed at all.

                From Section 22 of the revised rules, the Commission on Appointments may either confirm or disapprove an appointment, and notice of such action shall not be conveyed to the President while a motion for reconsideration is pending. It has been established here that on July 19, 1962, notice of the confirmation of Quimsing's appointment was delivered to Malacañang. This action by the Commission on Appointments supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed.

Jorge vs Mayor

Jorge vs Mayor

G.R. No. L-21776            

February 28, 1964

FACTS:

                Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a Junior Computer in the course of 38 years service, from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and attained the position of Acting Director, through regular and successive promotions, in accordance with civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the December 23, 1961. His appointment was on December 26, 1961, transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962, petitioner's ad interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission.

                On November 14, 1962 he received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Macapagal administration, informing him that pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary Bernal, served on Jorge on November 13, his appointment was among those revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the position of Director of Lands was considered vacant; and that Jorge was designated Acting Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon learning that Mayor, an outsider, had been designate by the President to be Acting Director of Lands Jorge protested (in a letter of November 16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that he would stand on his rights, and issued office circulars claiming to be the legally appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963, he instituted the present proceedings.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapaga operated as a valid revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.

RULING:

                No. The SC ruled that Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Director of Lands.

                Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of which SC may take judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and thereafter, the office never became vacant.

                In common with the Gillera appointment sustained by the SC, Jorge's appointment is featured by a recognition of his tenure by the Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed to hold and discharge undisturbed his duties as de jure Director of Lands for nearly eleven months and it was only in mid-November of 1962 that the attempt was actually made to demote him and appoint a rank outsider in his place in the person of respondent Mayor.

                If anyone is entitled to the protection of the civil service provisions of the Constitution, particularly those against removals without lawful cause, it must be the officers who, like Jorge, entered the Civil Service in their youth, bent on making a career out of it, gave it the best years of their lives and grew gray therein in the hope and expectation that they would eventually attain the upper reaches and levels of the official hierarchy, not through political patronage, but through loyalty, merit, and faithful and unremitting toil.

Rufino vs Endriga

Rufino vs Endriga

G.R. No. 139554

July 21, 2006

FACTS: 

On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.

On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law,    President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP’s charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of politics.” PD 15 increased the members of CCP’s Board from seven to nine trustees.  Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.  

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board.   Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison,  Potenciano,  Fernandez, Lenora  A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and  Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).

            On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were:

1.  Armita B. Rufino        -     President, vice Baltazar                       

                                  N. Endriga

2.  Zenaida R. Tantoco      -     Member, vice Doreen Fernandez

3.  Federico Pascual        -      Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili

4.  Rafael Buenaventura     -     Member, vice Manuel T. Mañosa

5.  Lorenzo Calma           -     Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo

6.  Rafael Simpao, Jr.      -     Member, vice Patricia C. Sison

7.     Freddie Garcia       -     Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile

                                        Potenciano

Except for Tantoco,  the Rufino group  took  their  respective oaths of office and assumed  the performance of their duties in early January 1999.

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning President Estrada’s appointment of   seven new members to the CCP Board.  The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x.”   In case “only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].”  The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa’s term.  The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.

The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President.  The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”

On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition.  The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees.  On the other hand, the appellate court’s Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.

In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board.  The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank.   Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power.

On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group’s motion for reconsideration.  The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga group’s motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

         

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.  

ISSUE: 

 

Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.

RULING:

NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended  which authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is unconstitutional.

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.   The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President.  Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.  

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”  This provision does not free the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional.  This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of control. 

The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence.  By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.  Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.  

Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan

Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 152259

July 29, 2004

Facts:

     The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an information before the anti-graft court on July 12, 1989 charging Romualdez with violation of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.

     The information states that on or about and during the period from July 16 to July 29, 1975, Romualdez, brother-in-law of President Marcos, former president of the Philippines, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident of bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interest and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority of stocks of which is owned by former Pres. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P 5, 000, 000.00.

       Romualdez argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp – of former President Marcos. He relies on Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which states that:

“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by other pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.”       

Issue:

      Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, Romualdez is immune from criminal prosecution.

Ruling:

      No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in Sec. 17, Art Vii of 1973 Constitution is not applicable to Romualdez because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.

      In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. Romualdez’s reasoning fails since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as president. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.”

NAPOCOR vs PUREFOODS

NAPOCOR vs PUREFOODS

G.R. No. 160725

September 12, 2008

National Power Corporation, Petitioner, vs PUREFOODS Corporation, Solid Development Corporation, Jose Ortega Jr., Silvestre Bautista, Alfredo Cabande, Heirs of Victor Trinidad and Moldex Reality Incorporated, Respondents

Facts:

    NAPOCOR, a government-owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking development of hydroelectric power generation, the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources and the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, is also empowered to acquire property incident to or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out its purpose. It is also empowered to enter private property in the lawful performance of its business purposed provided  that the owners of such private property shall be indemnified for any damage that may be caused thereby and exercise the right of eminent domain.

     In order to construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Project , NAPOCOR had to acquire an easement if right-of-way over certain parcels of land situated in the towns of Angat, San Rafael and San Ildefonso and in the city of San Jose del Monte ---- all in the province of Bulacan.

     On November 5, 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for eminent domain before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The defendants were the vendors and vendees of the affected parcels of land.

The complaint alleged that the defendants were either the registered owners or the claimants of the affected pieces of properties. It also alleged that the public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land consisting of 62,426.50 sq.m. It also averred that the affected properties were selected by NAPOCOR in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and had not been expropriated for public use and that the negotiations between the NAPOCOR and the defendants failed. The complaint prayed, among others, that the RTC issue a writ of possession in favor of the NAPOCOR in the event that it would be refused entry to the affected properties. Only the defendants herein filed their respective answers.

Respondents Heirs of Trinidad claimed that they should be indemnified for the value of the affected property based on the prevailing market purchase price of P 750/sq.m. They also added that there are other parcels of land within the area which are more suitable for NAPOCOR’s project.

Respondent Moldex, alleged that the expropriation of part if the landholding in which it has propriety interest would divest the peripheral area of its value and render the same totally useless and thus must be compensated for the loss of the peripheral area as well.

Purefoods Corporation and SDC prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. SDC averred that the taking would not serve any public purpose and that the selection of its property for expropriation would not be compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. Purefoods who also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint argued that NAPOCOR failed to append copies of the pertinent Torrens titles to the complaint. It also averred that NAPOCOR’s offer was excessively low, undervalued and obsolete and that its action had caused extreme prejudice to its investment and further delay in the construction and development of its piggery business, thereby adversely affecting its operation.

On December 19, 1997, NAPOCOR filed its Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession wherein it alleged that it had deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the amount of P 126, 565.42 as provisional valuation of the properties sought to be expropriated and that it had sent a Notice to Take Possession of the said properties. The RTC directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of possession on January 6, 1998.

The RTC issued an order dated June 14, 1999, after the pre-trial conference, reflecting he parties’ agreement to limit the issues to the amount of just compensation and to whether respondent Moldex was entitles to just compensation on the devaluation of the peripheral area within its property.

The RTC appointed a second set of commissioners after the first set of appointed commissioners failed to discharge their duties. On May 18, 2001, the commissioners submitted separate reports to the RTC which formed part of the case records. The commissioners recommended that the compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on the fair market value of P 600.00/sq.m. for the properties belonging to Moldex and P 400.00/sq.m. for the undeveloped and underdeveloped properties belonging to the rest of the respondents. In the rendered decision of the RTC dated December 17, 2001, it fixed the amount of P600.00/sq.m. for the land of Moldex as just compensation and P400.00/sq.m. for the properties of the other respondents and payment of interest of 12% per annum from the finality of its decision until full payment thereof.

Moldex sought for reconsideration of the said decision but was denied by the RTC in its Order dated December 7, 2001. Both Moldex and NAPOCOR filed separate appeals before the Court of Appeals.

Moldex argues that the RTC erred in the following instances: (1) in ruling that just compensation should be paid at P600/sq.m. and not P1,600/sq.m; (2) in not imposing interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the taking until the finality of the decision and; (3) in not ordering the payment of just compensation for the peripheral portion of the affected property.

NAPOCOR assailed the RTC’s valuations of the properties at P600/sq.m and P400/sq.m, contending that the same are not based on the value of the properties at the time of the taking when the properties were still agricultural in nature. It claimed that only an easement fee, which should not exceed 10% of the declared market value, should be paid to the respondents. It also questioned the awared of interest of 12% per annum from the finality of the decision until the full payment of the amount adjudged.

On November 7, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision in all respect except for the period during which the interest of 12% per annum would accrue.

Moldex sought the reconsideration of the November 7, 2003 decision of the CA while NAPOCOR, through the OSG, elevated the case to the SC via petition for review of certiorari.

ISSUE:

      Whether or not only the easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid for the affected owners.

RULING:

     No. The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by NAPOCOR’s transmission lines has already been answered in the case of NAPOCOR vs Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. In the said case, it was held that because of the nature of the easement, which will deprive normal use of ther land for an indefinite period, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected properties. Also in the case of NAPOCOR vs Aguirre-Paderanga, the court noted that the passage of NAPOCOR’s transmission lines over the affected property causes not only actual damage but also restriction on the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property. While in the said case NAPOCOR was seeking to acquire only an easement of the right-of-way, the court nonetheless rules that the just compensation in the amount of only 10% of the market value of the property was not enough to indemnify the incursion of the affected property.

                The Court explained therein that expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the terms “expropriation”. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitles is the market value and market value is the “sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and receive therefor. The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits.”

       While section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

        Thus, the decision of the RTC and CA with regard to the value of just compensation of P 400/sq.m. of the properties of the respondents except for Moldex which is P600/sq.m.  is affirmed.

Acaylar vs Harayo

Pablo D. Acaylar Jr. vs Danilo G. Harayo
G.R. No. 176995
July 30, 2008

Facts:

            Harayo bought a parcel of land designated as Lot 741-B-1 situated in Tolon, Potungan, Dapitan City, with an area of 30,000 square meters from spouses Pablo Acaylar, Sr., and Zoila Dangcalan Acaylar. Harayo alleged that he acquired the subject property by virtue of the Deed of Sale executed on September 14, 2004 by the spouses Acaylar and on the same day he acquired possession of the subject property. On September 19, 2004, one of the spouses Acaylar’s sons, the Acaylar Jr., using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the subject property, cut the tall grasses in the coconut plantation therein, gathered the fallen coconuts and other fruits, and pastured his cows and other animals thereon.

            In Acaylar Jr.’s answer, he countered that the subject property claimed by respondent is a portion of the entire property owned by his parents, the spouses Acaylar, with a total area of 59,775 square meters.  Acaylar Jr. is in possession of his parents’ entire property since 1979 as administrator thereof.  He built his house on the property and farmed the land.  Respondent cannot definitively claim which portion of the entire property he was able to buy from the spouses Acaylar since the same was not clearly delineated.

            Among the pieces of evidence presented by Harayo before the MTCC was an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar (First Affidavit) attesting that she sold the subject property to respondent for consideration and she did not give petitioner authority to either administer or remain on her and her husband’s property.

            After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision on March 28, 2005, awarding to Harayo the possession of the subject property.  The MTCC gave credence to Harayo’s claim that he took immediate possession of the subject property after the execution of the Deed of Sale but was ousted therefrom by Acaylar Jr. who invoked the alleged authority granted to him by Zoila Acaylar as the administrator of the unsold portion of her and her husband’s property.

            On Appeal, the RTC promulgated its Decision dated January 20, 2006 affirming the award of possession in favor of respondent after finding that the appealed MTCC Decision was based on facts and law on the matter.  The RTC declared that the sale of the subject property by the spouses Acaylar to Harayo vested ownership and possession of said property in the latter.

Banking on another Affidavit (Second Affidavit) executed by Zoila Acaylar, in which she recanted the statements she made in her First Affidavit denying that she designated petitioner as the administrator of her and her husband’s property, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the January 20, 2006 Decision of the RTC.  The RTC, however, denied Acaylar Jr.’s Motion for reconsideration in its issued Resolution dated April 18, 2006. 

            Consequently, Acaylar Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. He argued in his Petition that the RTC gravely erred in ruling that respondent was in prior possession of the subject property based solely on the Deed of Sale executed by the spouses Acaylar in Harayo’s favor.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not Harayo had actual or physical possession of the subject property which makes Acaylar Jr. an unlawful detainer and his acts such as cutting the tall grasses in the subject property constitute forcible entry.

RULING:

            No. The SC is not persuaded by Harayo’s assertion that after he took possession of the subject property from the Acaylar spouses and Acaylar Jr. entered the subject property on a whim, for not only does such postulation lack clear, positive, and convincing evidentiary support, but also because it is illogical and contrary to common human experience.  A person would not, for a reason so shallow as a whim, encroach upon another’s property and gather fruits and other agricultural products therefrom, thereby risking criminal prosecution and civil liabilities.  The more plausible and logical scenario would be that Acaylar Jr.  was already occupying the subject property prior to the sale.  Acaylar Jr., in gathering the coconut fruits and other crops, cutting grasses, and domesticating animals on the subject property, even after its sale to Harayo on September 14, 2004, was only continuing to exercise acts of possession over the subject property as he had done in years before.   

Both the MTCC and the RTC decided in favor of Harayo since they considered him to have been vested with possession of the subject property by virtue of the execution of the Deed of Sale on September 14, 2004.  However, such a ruling violates one of the most basic doctrines in resolving ejectment cases.  The SC had long settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property, that is, possession de facto; and they should not involve the question of ownership or of possession de jure, which is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.

 In conclusion, since Acaylar Jr. was in prior physical possession of the subject property, Harayo has no cause of action against him for forcible entry.  Neither can we treat Harayo’s case against Acaylar Jr.  as one for unlawful detainer absent the jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate made upon Acaylar Jr.. 

Legarda vs De Castro

Legarda vs De Castro

P.E.T. Case 0003

March 31, 2005

Loren B. Legarda, protestant, vs Noli L.De Castro, protestee.

Facts:

         In a Resolution dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee, Noli L. de Castro for its outright dismissal.  The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and preservation of the ballot boxes and election documents subject of the protest.

    On February 4, 2005, De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said resolution.   

      De Castro argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).  But it is not suggested by any of the parties that questions on the validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

       Whether or not the Tribunal can re-canvass the ballots and can correct the manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

  

RULING:

      Yes.  The SC finds no reason why the Tribunal cannot perform this function.  SC agrees that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. Legarda merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition of votes.

           

The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.  Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There is no necessity, in the SC’s view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional function.

 In the instant protest, Legarda enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein.  The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to De Castro’s title to his office.

Considering that the protest is sufficient in form and substance, the SC again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations.  The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the Legarda the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.