PEOPLE vs CONSEJERO G.R. No. 118334 February 20, 2011

PEOPLE vs CONSEJERO

G.R. No. 118334

February 20, 2011

FACTS: Morning of May 26, 1989, the dead bodies of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan were found  not far from the river bank of Brgy. Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The two were killed by allegedly killed by Larry Consejero, herein accused and Rommel Malapit (still at large).

According to the testimony of Melchor Pulido, He was invited by Consejero to gather fish caught in the Cagayan River. Then he, together with Consejero and Malapit, who were both armed with M-14 rifle, rode a banca towards Brgy. Jurisdiccion aound 8:00-9:00PM of May 25, 1989. After emptying the contents of the fishnets, they saw motorized banca at a distance and they paddled towards the said banca. The people riding on the said motorized banca were the victims, Castillo and Usigan. Consejero then asked the two if they were the people who demand quota from Brgy. Capt. Bacuyan to which the two replied “No.” Afterwards, Consejero asked the two if there is any store nearby which the two affirms. Consejero then asked the two men to accompany them to the said store and so the two bancas proceeded to the river bank.

Upon reaching the shore, Consejero said that only one man should accompany them, hence Usigan went with them and they went to the northeast direction. After 10 minutes, Consejero and Malapit retuned with armalite and bolo respectively but Usigan was no were in sight. Consejero then ordered Malapit to tie the hands of Castillo and then they brought him to the same northeast direction. The two returned without Castillo. Consejero then detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by Usigan and Castillo and told Pulido to stand as lookout. They then head home after loading the said engine to their banca. On their way, Cansejero and Malapit told Pulido that Usigan and Castillo were already dead and threatened him that they will kill him and his family if he reveals what he knew.

The following day, the lifeless bodies of Usigan and Castillo were found and the postmortem examination reveals that the two died around 7:00PM-12:00MN of May 25, 1989.

The two accused, Consejero and Malapit were found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was a special complex crime of robber with homicide.

RULING:               No. The SC believes that the crime committed were separate crime of robbery and homicide based on the evidence and testimony presented.

The elements of Robbery with homicide are: a) taking of personal property with the use of violence, or intimidation against a person; b) the property taken belongs to another; c) the taking is characterized with intent to gain and d) on the occasion of robber, or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.

In the present case, the Court finds that it does not appear that the main purpose of Consejero in accosting the two deceased was to rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications, Consejero, a CAFGU member, was primarily interested in taking the life of the two deceased whom he suspected to be the ones taking quota from the Brgy. Captain, and the taking of the engine of the banca was merely an afterthought that arose subsequent to the killing of the victims.

Consejero was then charged of three different crimes, namely: murder for the killing of Castillo, because the killing was undoubtedly attended by circumstance of treachery (by tying the victim’s hand); homicide for the death of Usigan, because although treachery was alleged in the information, the Court finds that there is no evidence showing that Consejero and Malapit adopted means and methods that would make certain the killing of the victim would not cause risk to them; and theft for taking the engine of the motorized banca ridden by the two deceased and owned by a certain Jaime Israel.

U.S. vs. Sana Lim 28 Phil. 404 November 19, 1914

U.S. vs. Sana Lim

28 Phil. 404

November 19, 1914

FACTS: Sana Lim together with Sionga Yap, Dina Lim, Jing Kong Kiang a.ka.a Esteban and Tiburcio Ricablanca were charged of the crime of robbery after they seized 101 tins of opium from a Moro named Jamilassan and appropriated to themselves 77 tins out of the 101 tins.

According to the facts of the case, the idea to seize the opium was conceived by Ricablanca on September 11, 1913 when Sionga reported to him that opium was being offered for sale. Ricablanca  with intent to obtain in lawful gain, arranged that one of the Chinaman should pretended that he would buy the opium and together rwith his accomplices, they would arrest the Moro and seize the opium. In order for them to appropriate it to themselves they would substitute part of it with molasses and deliver it to the authorities together with the bearer of the drug.

To carry out the conceived plan, the Chinamen Sionga and Dina bought molasses while Ricablanca gave order to the police sergeant Eleno Suizo to take two subordinates, who will dress as civilians and would accompany Sionga, who would pretend to be the purchaser.

On the night of September 11, 1913, the group went to carry out the plan. When the Moro Jamilassan with his companions and his employer Tahil with the 101 tins of opium came to the shore of the barrio of Simala, Sionga, as agreed by his companions lit some matches twice as a signal and then the defendants appeared upon the scene led by the sergeant and his policemen. They arrested Jamilassan while the other Moro successfully escaped. The defendants then went to appropriate to themselves 77 tins of opium, set aside 12 of them and replaced the contents of the 11 tins with molasses while 1 tin was lost. The 12 tins of opium and 11 tins of molasses were then delivered by the defendants to the authorities as having been legally seized in the possession of Jamilassan.

The defendants were then charged given penalty of six years ten months and one day of prision mayor and to pay, each of them, one ninth of the costs.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not Sana Lim and Dina Lim be punished as principals in the crime of robbery.

      b. Whether or not the crime should be estafa and not robbery.

RULING: a. No. The Court finds Sana Lim and Dina Lim as mere accomplices to the commission of the crime. Although they cooperated by acts prior and simultaneous with the perpetration of the crime, the records did not clearly show that they performed acts that were necessary and indispensable for the consummation of the crime. The two, with knowledge of the commission of robbery and with the intent to obtain unlawful gain, they accompanied the principals in the crime up to a certain distance from, though not near, the place where the robbery took place. Moreover, the two did not approach the place until after the robbery took place and when then for the purpose of sharing or the division of the opium stolen. Thus, the acts of the two defendants did not fall within any of the classes specified in Art. 13 of the Penal Code, which treats of the principals, the two then, are to be considered as mere accomplices of the principals in the robbery.

b. No. The Court is not persuaded with the contention of the defense that the guilty persons first acted in good faith in the discharge of their duties and without any lawful intention, and the intent to commit illicit gain was formed only after they had legally seized the property, and thus the crimes should be estafa and not robbery. According to the Court, both Ricablanca and the Chinese appellants already had the intention to appropriate to themselves the greater part of the drug from the moment they proposed to seize the opium carried for sale by the Moro Jamilassan. In fact, they even planned to deceive the authorities by substituting the contents of 11 of the 23 tins of opium with molasses of which they presented to the authorities as legally seized from Jamilassan. They also kept 77 of the tins seized and did not report it to their superior, nor does the records show that the said tins were afterwards recovered from the defendants. Hence, the crime in question is classified as robbery and not estafa.

RODRIGO vs RODRIGO 16 SCRA 475 March, 1966

RODRIGO vs RODRIGO

16 SCRA 475

March, 1966

FACTS: On March 8, 1960 and months previous, Romualdo Rodrigo, accused, deliberately did there and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally kept in his possession one male horse which is specifically described under Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle No. 4685981, legally belonging to FELIX MUERTEIGUE, said accused knowing as he does that the aforementioned horse was stolen from the ranch of said Felix Muertigue at Casabangan, Pio V. Corpuz, Masbate, and deliberately failed as he did fail to deliver the same to the authorities or to its owner.

Rodrigo was charge with crime of theft of large cattle, but the case was dismissed by the Justice of the Peace of Pio V. Corpuz. The said order was affirmed by the CFI of Masbate, hence the Solicitor General appeals the case before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the complaint of theft of large cattle was defective because the element of “intent to gain” is not alleged.

RULING: Yes. The Court finds that the complaint filed against the defendant-appellee satisfies the requirements in charging the offense of theft of large cattle as defined in Art. 310 in relation to Par. 2, subparagraph 1, Art. 308 of the RPC.

Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court states that an information or complaint is considered sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must also be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounced his proper judgment

Moreover, the complaint in question designates the offense charged as "theft of large cattle." This is the crime defined in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 308 thereof.  Although one of the elements essential in the crime of theft of large cattle in Art. 308 is intent to gain, under paragraph 2, subparagraph (1) of the same article, however, the elements are (1) the finding of lost property; and (2) the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner. In this kind of theft intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does not belong to him.

The appellee’s contention that the complaint refer to a stolen horse does not fall under said particular paragraph, "stolen property" not being the same as "lost property” is without merit. The word "lost" is generic in nature, and embraces loss by stealing or by any act of a person other than the owner, as well as by the act of the owner himself or through some casual occurrence. If anything, the finder who fails deliberately to return the thing lost may be considered more blameworthy if the loss was by stealing than through some other means.

PEOPLE vs. ABLAZA G.R. No. L-27352 October 31, 1969

PEOPLE vs. ABLAZA

G.R. No. L-27352

October 31, 1969

FACTS: A criminal case for forcible abduction with rape was filed against Ruben Ablaza, herein accused, in the CFI of Bulacan after he allegedly forcibly took Annabelle Huggins, herein complainant, from her aunt’s place in Caloocan City and brought her to a house in Barrio Hagonoy, Bulacan, where Ablaza criminally abused her.

On March 22, 1963, while the said case of forcible abduction with rape was still pending, Huggins, who was sweeping the front of her aunt’s house in Makati, was grabbed by two men and forcibly taken to a taxicab where Ablaza was waiting. The vehicle sped away before anybody could come to help Huggins. While inside the cab, Huggins was seated between Ablaza and his companion and her head was pressed down to the floor of the taxi with Ablaza’s hand covering her mouth to prevent her from crying for help. Huggins was taken to the house of Ablaza’s compadre in Caloocan but was moved to another house of Ablaza’s another compadre after being informed that the police were already in their pursuit. There, Huggins was kept for a week with Ablaza and his compadres always guarding her to prevent her escape. Ablaza was arrested when he took Huggins to Bulacan in order to ask for the complaint against him be dropped. Huggins’ uncle, in the company of Contabulary men, was able to rescue her from Ablaza while they were inside the Malolos Municipal Building.

The CFI of Rizal, in its decision dated March 7, 1967, found the accused guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, and was sentenced to death. Hence, this automatic review of the decision of the CFI of Rizal.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not Ablaza committed kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

        b. Whether or not there was an error of considering motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime.

RULING: a. Yes. Ablaza’s contention that he should be adjudged of abduction with rape rather than kidnapping with serious illegal detention bears no merit. He stood trial for kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and the deprivation of the complainant’s liberty, which is the essential element of the offense was duly proved and other crimes committed in the course of the victim’s confinement is immaterial to the case. The kidnapping became consummated when the victim as actually deprived of her freedom which makes it proper to prosecute the accused under Article 267 of the RPC. The surrounding circumstance make it clear that the main purpose of Ablaza in detaining Huggins was to coerce her to withdraw her previous charges against him.

The Court also finds no reason not to believe the judgment of the trial judge giving credence to Huggins’ declaration. The records of the case are convincing that the complainant’s testimony on the facts of the kidnapping rang of truth. Not only that her narration was coherent, plausible and unshattered by the defense counsel’s cross examination, but also no motive has been adduced by Huggins, who, since the first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore, would have wanted least public exposure of her harrowing experiences, would come out and undergo another legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters with the accused, other than her desire to tell the truth.

b. No. The said contention is untenable. Contrary to the protestation of the accused, the fact of use of motor vehicle which facilitated the taking away of the complainant and her consequent detention was established not only by her declaration in court but also by the accused’s own admission that he took away Huggins from her Aunt’s residence in Makati by taxi cab.

Considering the extant evidence on record, the Court fully agree with the decision of the trial court’s decision that the accused Reuben Ablaza committed the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention attended by aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle. The Court thus confirms the death penalty imposed by the lower court.