PEOPLE vs CONSEJERO G.R. No. 118334 February 20, 2011

PEOPLE vs CONSEJERO

G.R. No. 118334

February 20, 2011

FACTS: Morning of May 26, 1989, the dead bodies of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan were found  not far from the river bank of Brgy. Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The two were killed by allegedly killed by Larry Consejero, herein accused and Rommel Malapit (still at large).

According to the testimony of Melchor Pulido, He was invited by Consejero to gather fish caught in the Cagayan River. Then he, together with Consejero and Malapit, who were both armed with M-14 rifle, rode a banca towards Brgy. Jurisdiccion aound 8:00-9:00PM of May 25, 1989. After emptying the contents of the fishnets, they saw motorized banca at a distance and they paddled towards the said banca. The people riding on the said motorized banca were the victims, Castillo and Usigan. Consejero then asked the two if they were the people who demand quota from Brgy. Capt. Bacuyan to which the two replied “No.” Afterwards, Consejero asked the two if there is any store nearby which the two affirms. Consejero then asked the two men to accompany them to the said store and so the two bancas proceeded to the river bank.

Upon reaching the shore, Consejero said that only one man should accompany them, hence Usigan went with them and they went to the northeast direction. After 10 minutes, Consejero and Malapit retuned with armalite and bolo respectively but Usigan was no were in sight. Consejero then ordered Malapit to tie the hands of Castillo and then they brought him to the same northeast direction. The two returned without Castillo. Consejero then detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by Usigan and Castillo and told Pulido to stand as lookout. They then head home after loading the said engine to their banca. On their way, Cansejero and Malapit told Pulido that Usigan and Castillo were already dead and threatened him that they will kill him and his family if he reveals what he knew.

The following day, the lifeless bodies of Usigan and Castillo were found and the postmortem examination reveals that the two died around 7:00PM-12:00MN of May 25, 1989.

The two accused, Consejero and Malapit were found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was a special complex crime of robber with homicide.

RULING:               No. The SC believes that the crime committed were separate crime of robbery and homicide based on the evidence and testimony presented.

The elements of Robbery with homicide are: a) taking of personal property with the use of violence, or intimidation against a person; b) the property taken belongs to another; c) the taking is characterized with intent to gain and d) on the occasion of robber, or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.

In the present case, the Court finds that it does not appear that the main purpose of Consejero in accosting the two deceased was to rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications, Consejero, a CAFGU member, was primarily interested in taking the life of the two deceased whom he suspected to be the ones taking quota from the Brgy. Captain, and the taking of the engine of the banca was merely an afterthought that arose subsequent to the killing of the victims.

Consejero was then charged of three different crimes, namely: murder for the killing of Castillo, because the killing was undoubtedly attended by circumstance of treachery (by tying the victim’s hand); homicide for the death of Usigan, because although treachery was alleged in the information, the Court finds that there is no evidence showing that Consejero and Malapit adopted means and methods that would make certain the killing of the victim would not cause risk to them; and theft for taking the engine of the motorized banca ridden by the two deceased and owned by a certain Jaime Israel.

U.S. vs. Sana Lim 28 Phil. 404 November 19, 1914

U.S. vs. Sana Lim

28 Phil. 404

November 19, 1914

FACTS: Sana Lim together with Sionga Yap, Dina Lim, Jing Kong Kiang a.ka.a Esteban and Tiburcio Ricablanca were charged of the crime of robbery after they seized 101 tins of opium from a Moro named Jamilassan and appropriated to themselves 77 tins out of the 101 tins.

According to the facts of the case, the idea to seize the opium was conceived by Ricablanca on September 11, 1913 when Sionga reported to him that opium was being offered for sale. Ricablanca  with intent to obtain in lawful gain, arranged that one of the Chinaman should pretended that he would buy the opium and together rwith his accomplices, they would arrest the Moro and seize the opium. In order for them to appropriate it to themselves they would substitute part of it with molasses and deliver it to the authorities together with the bearer of the drug.

To carry out the conceived plan, the Chinamen Sionga and Dina bought molasses while Ricablanca gave order to the police sergeant Eleno Suizo to take two subordinates, who will dress as civilians and would accompany Sionga, who would pretend to be the purchaser.

On the night of September 11, 1913, the group went to carry out the plan. When the Moro Jamilassan with his companions and his employer Tahil with the 101 tins of opium came to the shore of the barrio of Simala, Sionga, as agreed by his companions lit some matches twice as a signal and then the defendants appeared upon the scene led by the sergeant and his policemen. They arrested Jamilassan while the other Moro successfully escaped. The defendants then went to appropriate to themselves 77 tins of opium, set aside 12 of them and replaced the contents of the 11 tins with molasses while 1 tin was lost. The 12 tins of opium and 11 tins of molasses were then delivered by the defendants to the authorities as having been legally seized in the possession of Jamilassan.

The defendants were then charged given penalty of six years ten months and one day of prision mayor and to pay, each of them, one ninth of the costs.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not Sana Lim and Dina Lim be punished as principals in the crime of robbery.

      b. Whether or not the crime should be estafa and not robbery.

RULING: a. No. The Court finds Sana Lim and Dina Lim as mere accomplices to the commission of the crime. Although they cooperated by acts prior and simultaneous with the perpetration of the crime, the records did not clearly show that they performed acts that were necessary and indispensable for the consummation of the crime. The two, with knowledge of the commission of robbery and with the intent to obtain unlawful gain, they accompanied the principals in the crime up to a certain distance from, though not near, the place where the robbery took place. Moreover, the two did not approach the place until after the robbery took place and when then for the purpose of sharing or the division of the opium stolen. Thus, the acts of the two defendants did not fall within any of the classes specified in Art. 13 of the Penal Code, which treats of the principals, the two then, are to be considered as mere accomplices of the principals in the robbery.

b. No. The Court is not persuaded with the contention of the defense that the guilty persons first acted in good faith in the discharge of their duties and without any lawful intention, and the intent to commit illicit gain was formed only after they had legally seized the property, and thus the crimes should be estafa and not robbery. According to the Court, both Ricablanca and the Chinese appellants already had the intention to appropriate to themselves the greater part of the drug from the moment they proposed to seize the opium carried for sale by the Moro Jamilassan. In fact, they even planned to deceive the authorities by substituting the contents of 11 of the 23 tins of opium with molasses of which they presented to the authorities as legally seized from Jamilassan. They also kept 77 of the tins seized and did not report it to their superior, nor does the records show that the said tins were afterwards recovered from the defendants. Hence, the crime in question is classified as robbery and not estafa.

RODRIGO vs RODRIGO 16 SCRA 475 March, 1966

RODRIGO vs RODRIGO

16 SCRA 475

March, 1966

FACTS: On March 8, 1960 and months previous, Romualdo Rodrigo, accused, deliberately did there and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally kept in his possession one male horse which is specifically described under Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle No. 4685981, legally belonging to FELIX MUERTEIGUE, said accused knowing as he does that the aforementioned horse was stolen from the ranch of said Felix Muertigue at Casabangan, Pio V. Corpuz, Masbate, and deliberately failed as he did fail to deliver the same to the authorities or to its owner.

Rodrigo was charge with crime of theft of large cattle, but the case was dismissed by the Justice of the Peace of Pio V. Corpuz. The said order was affirmed by the CFI of Masbate, hence the Solicitor General appeals the case before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the complaint of theft of large cattle was defective because the element of “intent to gain” is not alleged.

RULING: Yes. The Court finds that the complaint filed against the defendant-appellee satisfies the requirements in charging the offense of theft of large cattle as defined in Art. 310 in relation to Par. 2, subparagraph 1, Art. 308 of the RPC.

Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court states that an information or complaint is considered sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must also be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounced his proper judgment

Moreover, the complaint in question designates the offense charged as "theft of large cattle." This is the crime defined in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 308 thereof.  Although one of the elements essential in the crime of theft of large cattle in Art. 308 is intent to gain, under paragraph 2, subparagraph (1) of the same article, however, the elements are (1) the finding of lost property; and (2) the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner. In this kind of theft intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does not belong to him.

The appellee’s contention that the complaint refer to a stolen horse does not fall under said particular paragraph, "stolen property" not being the same as "lost property” is without merit. The word "lost" is generic in nature, and embraces loss by stealing or by any act of a person other than the owner, as well as by the act of the owner himself or through some casual occurrence. If anything, the finder who fails deliberately to return the thing lost may be considered more blameworthy if the loss was by stealing than through some other means.

PEOPLE vs. ABLAZA G.R. No. L-27352 October 31, 1969

PEOPLE vs. ABLAZA

G.R. No. L-27352

October 31, 1969

FACTS: A criminal case for forcible abduction with rape was filed against Ruben Ablaza, herein accused, in the CFI of Bulacan after he allegedly forcibly took Annabelle Huggins, herein complainant, from her aunt’s place in Caloocan City and brought her to a house in Barrio Hagonoy, Bulacan, where Ablaza criminally abused her.

On March 22, 1963, while the said case of forcible abduction with rape was still pending, Huggins, who was sweeping the front of her aunt’s house in Makati, was grabbed by two men and forcibly taken to a taxicab where Ablaza was waiting. The vehicle sped away before anybody could come to help Huggins. While inside the cab, Huggins was seated between Ablaza and his companion and her head was pressed down to the floor of the taxi with Ablaza’s hand covering her mouth to prevent her from crying for help. Huggins was taken to the house of Ablaza’s compadre in Caloocan but was moved to another house of Ablaza’s another compadre after being informed that the police were already in their pursuit. There, Huggins was kept for a week with Ablaza and his compadres always guarding her to prevent her escape. Ablaza was arrested when he took Huggins to Bulacan in order to ask for the complaint against him be dropped. Huggins’ uncle, in the company of Contabulary men, was able to rescue her from Ablaza while they were inside the Malolos Municipal Building.

The CFI of Rizal, in its decision dated March 7, 1967, found the accused guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, and was sentenced to death. Hence, this automatic review of the decision of the CFI of Rizal.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not Ablaza committed kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

        b. Whether or not there was an error of considering motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime.

RULING: a. Yes. Ablaza’s contention that he should be adjudged of abduction with rape rather than kidnapping with serious illegal detention bears no merit. He stood trial for kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and the deprivation of the complainant’s liberty, which is the essential element of the offense was duly proved and other crimes committed in the course of the victim’s confinement is immaterial to the case. The kidnapping became consummated when the victim as actually deprived of her freedom which makes it proper to prosecute the accused under Article 267 of the RPC. The surrounding circumstance make it clear that the main purpose of Ablaza in detaining Huggins was to coerce her to withdraw her previous charges against him.

The Court also finds no reason not to believe the judgment of the trial judge giving credence to Huggins’ declaration. The records of the case are convincing that the complainant’s testimony on the facts of the kidnapping rang of truth. Not only that her narration was coherent, plausible and unshattered by the defense counsel’s cross examination, but also no motive has been adduced by Huggins, who, since the first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore, would have wanted least public exposure of her harrowing experiences, would come out and undergo another legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters with the accused, other than her desire to tell the truth.

b. No. The said contention is untenable. Contrary to the protestation of the accused, the fact of use of motor vehicle which facilitated the taking away of the complainant and her consequent detention was established not only by her declaration in court but also by the accused’s own admission that he took away Huggins from her Aunt’s residence in Makati by taxi cab.

Considering the extant evidence on record, the Court fully agree with the decision of the trial court’s decision that the accused Reuben Ablaza committed the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention attended by aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle. The Court thus confirms the death penalty imposed by the lower court.

People vs Calongui G.R. No. 170566 March 3, 2006

People vs Calongui

G.R. No. 170566

March 3, 2006

FACTS: 2:00 AM of January 1, 1998, Marinel, who was 13 years old at that time, slept in the same room as the appellant, Calongui and her three siblings. She was awaken and found that her shorts and panties were already removed by Calongui. He threatened Marinel that he would kill her and her siblings if she would resist his sexual advances. Marinel, however, tried to repel his sexual assault by moving her body and kicking Calongui’s thighs but he still succeeded in having sexual congress with her. The next morning, Marinel learned that her brother, Noel, who was 12 years old at that time, saw the incident but pretended to be asleep out of fear that Calongui would harm him.  Marinel told her brother not to tell anyone what he saw and she also did not say anything to her parents out of fear that Calongui would make good his threats.

On September 26, 1998 at 3:00AM, Calongui again raped Marinel which was witnessed by Noel. She was undressed from waist down and threatened that she and her siblings be killed if she resisted.

Shortly after the second rape incident, Calongui worked as a laborer at B-Meg and stayed at B-Meg barracks. Encouraged by his absence, Marinel told her mother what happened which led to the filing of the instant criminal cases.

Noel testified that he saw her sister being raped by Calongui and on both occasions he pretended to be asleep out of fear and that he did not report the incident to his parents upon Marinel’s instructions and also because of Calongui’s threats. Dr. Salvacion Pantorgo, Medical Officer at the Bicol Medical Center in Naga City also testified that she physically examined Marinel on November 18, 1998 and found some superficial laceration on Marinel’s organ. Dr. Pantorgo also found Marinel to be in a non-virgin state.

Calongui denied that he had sexual intercourse with Marinel on January 1, 1998. He also claimed that the September 26, 1998 incident was consensual since he and Marinel were sweethearts at that time.

In its December 23, 2002 decision, the RTC of Camarines Sur convicted Calongui for two counts of rape; sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to indemnify the victim P 50, 000.00 as civil liability, P 50, 00.00 as moral damages and P 30, 000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the payment of exemplary damages. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sexual intercourse was consensual because they are sweethearts, if not, does the victim’s failure to offer tenacious resistance makes the act consensual.

RULING: No. The SC stated that it is already a well-settled rule that the sweethearts defense must be proven by compelling evidence, specifically, that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations. The appellant’s claim that he and Marinel were lovers remained uncorroborated and unsubstantiated for there are no momentos, notes, pictures, and love letters presented. Marinel also denied the alleged love relationship on direct cross-examination. Besides, the sweethearts defense cannot also rule out rape and even if it were true, the relationship does not, by itself, establish consent for love is not a license for lust.

The appellant’s claim that Marinel has bigger physique than him and could have resited and overcome his advances or could have shouted for help since her siblings and parents were nearby is also untenable. The time the rape incidents occurred, Marinel was still 13 years old thus she cannot be expected to put up a resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Marinel also testified that she was not of bigger built than the appellant at the time of the incident although she looked bigger than the appellant at the time she testified after the incidents two years ago. Moreover, Marinel’s failure to offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts.

The presence of force, threats and intimidation during the two rape incidents was also clearly established by the testimony of Marinel during the cross-examination.

The SC therefore denied the appeal and affirmed CA’s decision dated October 26, 2005 modifying the December 23, 2002 Judgment of the RTC of Camarines Sur.

PEOPLE vs ERROJO G.R. No. 102077 January 4, 2004

PEOPLE vs ERROJO

G.R. No. 102077

January 4, 2004

FACTS: Around 6:00 PM of March 5, 1989, the 14-year-old Anita Arabia, herein complainant, was wlaking alone on a pathway in Brgy. Cudian, Ivisan, Capiz on her way home from her sister’s house when a man collared her from behind. She looked back and recognized the man as the accused, Norberto Errojo.

The accused poked the complainant with a knife and held her by the neck and without saying a word, he pushed Arabia towards a forested area. Arabia, asked Errojo what he wanted from her but he just kep silent and continued to push her with a knife poked against her neck. Errojo then held Arabia by the shoulders and turned her body towards him and pushed her to the ground.

Errojo took off his pants and Arabia’s shorts and underwear with his right hand still thrusting the knife at the complainant’s neck. He warned her not to move and then went on top of her, inserted his organ into hers, and consummated the sexual act. Errojo repeated the coitus consuming more or less the same period as the first time. Thereafter, Errojo, before leaving, threatened Arabia that he will kill her and her brothers if she will tell her parents about the incident.

Arabia then wiped her private parts with her underwear and noticed blood in it. Nevertheless, she put it on together with her shorts and went home. When asked by her mother why she was late, Arabia lied by telling her that her sister asked her to watched their store. She then went to the comfort room, washed herself and went to sleep.

On March 12, 1989, a week after the incident, around 6:00PM, Errojo again accosted Arabia on her way home after bringing the laundry of her sister. He again succeeded in raping Arabia twice at the point of a knife and warned the complainant not to tell the incidents to her parents or brothers.

On November 16, 1989, Arabia submitted herself to a medical examination for she intended to take an advance officer’s course in the Citizen’s Military Training (CMT) of their school. Dr. Mariano Alovera, resident physician of the Roxas Memorial Hospital then discovered and informed her that she was in an advance state of preganancy being already 8 months in the family way. This is the time she disclosed to her mother the sexual assaults of Errojo upon her person on March 5 and 12, 1989. Arabia gave birth to a baby boy on December 11, 1989, whom she named Amor John Arabia.

The accused, Errojo, claimed on the other hand that on March 5, 1989 he worked with 4 other companions repairing the main gate of Crisanto Bista’s fishpond at Brgy. Cabugao from 7:00AM and went home at around 8:00PM. On March 12, he claimed that around 5:00PM, he and his son fetched water from a public faucet near the house of Crisanto Bista. Crisanto Bista corroborated Errojo’s testimony that on March 5, he had the main gate of his fishpond repaired by the accused and 4 other men from 6:00AM and invited the workers to have dinner at his house. He also testified that on March 12, he stayed at home and saw Errojo with his son fetch water from the faucet near his house at around 6:00PM.

ISSUES:    a. Whether or not employing not enough force that the law requires amounts to consent of the sexual assault.

       b. Whether or not the delay of making a criminal accusation impairs the credibility of the witness.

RULING: a. No. The SC sustained the trial court’s decision that force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible. What is necessary is that the force employed is sufficient to consummate the purpose of the offender or to bring about the result. The force and violence needed in rape is naturally relative and depends on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other.

In the case at bar, the court finds that the 14-year-old complainant is no match with the 41-year-old accused-appellant. The force and strength of the accused-appellant would have easily overcome any resistance that the complainant could have put up. Moreover, the assault was committed with a deadly knife, the sight of which would have necessarily evoked fear in the complainant. Hence, it is understandable if she easily succumbed to the sexual intrusion.

b. No. It has been held that the delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.

The complainant’s failure, in the case at bar, to disclose the outrage on her person including to her parents is also due to the threats on her life and her brothers. One cannot also expect a 14-year-old girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she was sexually assaulted. Moreover, she would not have filed the rape charges if she had not become pregnant. The Court has taken judicial cognizance that many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against their rapists and prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to the world and risk their rapist’s threats.

The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the trial court dated June 28, 1991 convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of rape.

People vs. Fabro G.R. No. 95089 August 11, 1997 (277 SCRA 19)

People vs. Fabro

G.R. No. 95089

August 11, 1997

FACTS: Sometime in the 2^nd week of April 1987, a strike was held by workers on the premises of the Casa Blanca, located at Barrio Baretto, Olongapo City, which the victim, Dionisio Joaquin was one of the organizers. Joaquin sought the assistance of his friends among whome was Anthony Beck, a stevedore and resident of Olongapo City.

At about 6:00 P.M. on April 11, 1987, Joaquin and Beck were at Whisky Bar fronting the Casa Blanca, at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City.  They were conversing while resting at the veranda of said Whisky Bar, fronting the Casa Blanca where a picket was being conducted by their co-strikers.   Both had fallen asleep, as they lacked sleep the previous nights, on a chair near each other with their feet resting on the veranda railings.

Anthony Beck fell asleep at about 4:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 12, 1987.  Shortly thereafter, at about 5:00 to 5:30 in the morning, he was awakened by gun report.  Opening his eyes, he saw Joaquin dead, with a single bullet wound on the forehead.  Blood was oozing from Joaquin's head.  Seeing a man running away from where he and Joaquin were seated, Anthony Beck then gave chase.  The fleeing man turned left on an alley and then right on another.  Beck lost him at the second turn.  He saw an old man who inquired why he was chasing the fleeing man.  Beck told the old man of the shooting incident.  Then and there the old man told Beck that the man he (Beck) was running after was “Badong,” later identified as the accused Nicomedes.

Police officers from the Olongapo Metrodiscom, led by Sgt. Felipe Bolina, proceeded to Fabro's residence at about noon that same day.  They failed to apprehend Fabro as he was allegedly then asleep.  The accused (Fabro) was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day.

At 6:00 o'clock that night, April 13, 1987, Fabro was interrogated by CIS personnel and grilled for about two (2) hours.  At that juncture, CIS investigator Santiago requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out to be his extra-judicial confession/admission.  Accused Fabro (claims that he) was not allowed to read the document, neither were its contents read to him. A certain Atty. Isagani Jungco was however present when he signed the document.

While it appears from the transcript that co-accused Francisco Dimalanta executed an extra-judicial statement (confession), Dimalanta himself was never presented in court as defense witness, as both accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during trial.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not the confession is admissible.

        b. Whether or not there is doubt in the identity of the     

           assailant.

        c. Whether or not the evidence is a hearsay.

        d. Whether or not there are conspiracy and treachery.

RULINGS: a. Jurisprudence defines confession as a a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. However, before such confession shall be admitted as evidence, it must satisfy the several requirements provided in Sec. 12 and 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. When all these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused.

In the case at bar, Fabro miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove that there was indeed force and intimidation on his person in order to secure his confession. The records show that appellant’s confession was sworn and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should have voiced his objection, if any.  Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante certified that he personally examined appellant and was convinced that the latter gave his statement freely and voluntarily and that he understood the contents of his confession.  Appellant’s failure to voice out his complaints is tantamount to a manifestation that indeed he waived his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Jungco in accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, the court finds Fabro’s lack of complaint or even any mention thereof to his sister and relatives who visited him at Camp Maquinaya where he was detained for one year further belies his claim which reinforces the trial court’s ruling. Aboveall, the court was convinced that the confession was voluntary because Fabro was able to tell that the confession contains exculpatory claims and facts which that only he could have known.

b. The SC is not persuaded by Fabro’s argument that Beck could not have seen the face of the person running away from the crime scene because it was dark and he had just awakened and it would take some time for his eyes to adjust. The court gives more weight on the witness’ testimony that he was able to see the Fabro’s face although he was not able to catch up with him, which in the open court he identified Fabro as the man he was chasing.

Against Fabro’s confession, the denial is actually a belated retraction of the said confession. The rule of the court is that repudiation and recantation of confessions which have been obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable and have negligible probative weight.

c. The SC did not sustain Fabro’s claim that the identification was hearsay because his name was allegedly given to Beck by a Eduardo Ragonton who was not presented as witness for Beck was still able to identify Fabro in an open court because he was able to see his face during that fateful night. Fabro’s name may be considered hearsay for it was supplied by another person however the witness however knew the identity of the appellant.

d. The SC finds the conspiracy of Fabro and his co-accused unquestionable and sustained the trial court’s ruling on the said issue. The SC upheld that the acts of the accused show that they were animated by the same purpose and were united in their execution.  When, by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object -- each doing a part so that their acts though apparently independent were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment -- conspiracy may be inferred.

From Fabro’s confession, it is clear that Dimalanta offered him money to kill Joaquin and that together with Alcala they observed the movements of the victim; that prior to the shooting, they had attempted to kill the victim at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of the shooting, on April 12, 1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene of the crime, acting as lookouts and awaiting the outcome of the killing.

Treachery is shown by the fact that appellant, after several days of observing the movements of the victim, shot the latter while he was asleep. The means of execution (1) gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) showed that such method was deliberately or consciously adopted.

The Supreme Court thus affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court with slight modification – changing penalty to reclusion perpetua after offsetting one egenric aggravating circumstance with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and increasing the indemnity to 50, 000.00 PhP.