People vs. Fabro
G.R. No. 95089
August 11, 1997
FACTS: Sometime in the 2nd week of April
1987, a strike was held by workers on the premises of the Casa Blanca, located
at Barrio Baretto, Olongapo City, which the victim, Dionisio Joaquin was one of
the organizers. Joaquin sought the assistance of his friends among whome was
Anthony Beck, a stevedore and resident of Olongapo City.
At about 6:00 P.M. on April 11, 1987, Joaquin and
Beck were at Whisky Bar fronting the Casa Blanca, at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo
City. They were conversing while resting
at the veranda of said Whisky Bar, fronting the Casa Blanca where a picket was
being conducted by their co-strikers.
Both had fallen asleep, as they lacked sleep the previous nights, on a
chair near each other with their feet resting on the veranda railings.
Anthony Beck fell asleep at about 4:00 o'clock in
the early morning of April 12, 1987.
Shortly thereafter, at about 5:00 to 5:30 in the morning, he was
awakened by gun report. Opening his
eyes, he saw Joaquin dead, with a single bullet wound on the forehead. Blood was oozing from Joaquin's head. Seeing a man running away from where he and
Joaquin were seated, Anthony Beck then gave chase. The fleeing man turned left on an alley and
then right on another. Beck lost him at
the second turn. He saw an old man who
inquired why he was chasing the fleeing man.
Beck told the old man of the shooting incident. Then and there the old man told Beck that the
man he (Beck) was running after was “Badong,” later identified as the accused
Nicomedes.
Police officers from the Olongapo Metrodiscom, led
by Sgt. Felipe Bolina, proceeded to Fabro's residence at about noon that same
day. They failed to apprehend Fabro as
he was allegedly then asleep. The
accused (Fabro) was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day.
At 6:00 o'clock that night, April 13, 1987, Fabro
was interrogated by CIS personnel and grilled for about two (2) hours. At that juncture, CIS investigator Santiago
requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out to be his extra-judicial
confession/admission. Accused Fabro (claims
that he) was not allowed to read the document, neither were its contents read
to him. A certain Atty. Isagani Jungco was however present when he signed the
document.
While it appears from the transcript that
co-accused Francisco Dimalanta executed an extra-judicial statement
(confession), Dimalanta himself was never presented in court as defense
witness, as both accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during trial.
ISSUES: a. Whether or not the confession is admissible.
b.
Whether or not there is doubt in the identity of the
assailant.
c.
Whether or not the evidence is a hearsay.
d.
Whether or not there are conspiracy and treachery.
RULINGS: a. Jurisprudence defines confession as a a
declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person,
stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. However, before such confession shall be admitted as
evidence, it must satisfy the several requirements provided in Sec. 12 and 17,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. A confession meeting all the foregoing
requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and
deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth
and conscience. When all these requirements are met and the confession is
admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue
pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused.
In the case at bar, Fabro miserably failed to
present any convincing evidence to prove that there was indeed force and
intimidation on his person in order to secure his confession. The records show
that appellant’s confession was sworn and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus
Dorante, to whom he could have and should have voiced his objection, if
any. Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante
certified that he personally examined appellant and was convinced that the
latter gave his statement freely and voluntarily and that he understood the
contents of his confession. Appellant’s
failure to voice out his complaints is tantamount to a manifestation that
indeed he waived his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Jungco in
accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, the court finds Fabro’s lack of
complaint or even any mention thereof to his sister and relatives who visited
him at Camp Maquinaya where he was detained for one year further belies his
claim which reinforces the trial court’s ruling. Aboveall, the court was
convinced that the confession was voluntary because Fabro was able to tell that
the confession contains exculpatory claims and facts which that only he could
have known.
b. The SC is not persuaded by Fabro’s argument that
Beck could not have seen the face of the person running away from the crime
scene because it was dark and he had just awakened and it would take some time
for his eyes to adjust. The court gives more weight on the witness’ testimony that
he was able to see the Fabro’s face although he was not able to catch up with
him, which in the open court he identified Fabro as the man he was chasing.
Against Fabro’s confession, the denial is actually
a belated retraction of the said confession. The rule of the court is that
repudiation and recantation of confessions which have been obtained in
accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable
and have negligible probative weight.
c. The SC did not sustain Fabro’s claim that the
identification was hearsay because his name was allegedly given to Beck by a
Eduardo Ragonton who was not presented as witness for Beck was still able to
identify Fabro in an open court because he was able to see his face during that
fateful night. Fabro’s name may be considered hearsay for it was supplied by
another person however the witness however knew the identity of the appellant.
d. The SC finds the conspiracy of Fabro and his
co-accused unquestionable and sustained the trial court’s ruling on the said
issue. The SC upheld that the acts of the accused show that they were animated
by the same purpose and were united in their execution. When, by their acts, two or more persons
proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object -- each doing a
part so that their acts though apparently independent were in fact connected,
indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment --
conspiracy may be inferred.
From Fabro’s confession, it is clear that Dimalanta
offered him money to kill Joaquin and that together with Alcala they observed
the movements of the victim; that prior to the shooting, they had attempted to
kill the victim at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of
the shooting, on April 12, 1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene
of the crime, acting as lookouts and awaiting the outcome of the killing.
Treachery is shown by the fact that appellant,
after several days of observing the movements of the victim, shot the latter
while he was asleep. The means of execution (1) gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) showed that such method
was deliberately or consciously adopted.
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the assailed
decision of the trial court with slight modification – changing penalty to
reclusion perpetua after offsetting one egenric aggravating circumstance with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and increasing the indemnity to
50, 000.00 PhP.
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