People vs Calongui G.R. No. 170566 March 3, 2006

People vs Calongui

G.R. No. 170566

March 3, 2006

FACTS: 2:00 AM of January 1, 1998, Marinel, who was 13 years old at that time, slept in the same room as the appellant, Calongui and her three siblings. She was awaken and found that her shorts and panties were already removed by Calongui. He threatened Marinel that he would kill her and her siblings if she would resist his sexual advances. Marinel, however, tried to repel his sexual assault by moving her body and kicking Calongui’s thighs but he still succeeded in having sexual congress with her. The next morning, Marinel learned that her brother, Noel, who was 12 years old at that time, saw the incident but pretended to be asleep out of fear that Calongui would harm him.  Marinel told her brother not to tell anyone what he saw and she also did not say anything to her parents out of fear that Calongui would make good his threats.

On September 26, 1998 at 3:00AM, Calongui again raped Marinel which was witnessed by Noel. She was undressed from waist down and threatened that she and her siblings be killed if she resisted.

Shortly after the second rape incident, Calongui worked as a laborer at B-Meg and stayed at B-Meg barracks. Encouraged by his absence, Marinel told her mother what happened which led to the filing of the instant criminal cases.

Noel testified that he saw her sister being raped by Calongui and on both occasions he pretended to be asleep out of fear and that he did not report the incident to his parents upon Marinel’s instructions and also because of Calongui’s threats. Dr. Salvacion Pantorgo, Medical Officer at the Bicol Medical Center in Naga City also testified that she physically examined Marinel on November 18, 1998 and found some superficial laceration on Marinel’s organ. Dr. Pantorgo also found Marinel to be in a non-virgin state.

Calongui denied that he had sexual intercourse with Marinel on January 1, 1998. He also claimed that the September 26, 1998 incident was consensual since he and Marinel were sweethearts at that time.

In its December 23, 2002 decision, the RTC of Camarines Sur convicted Calongui for two counts of rape; sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to indemnify the victim P 50, 000.00 as civil liability, P 50, 00.00 as moral damages and P 30, 000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the payment of exemplary damages. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sexual intercourse was consensual because they are sweethearts, if not, does the victim’s failure to offer tenacious resistance makes the act consensual.

RULING: No. The SC stated that it is already a well-settled rule that the sweethearts defense must be proven by compelling evidence, specifically, that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations. The appellant’s claim that he and Marinel were lovers remained uncorroborated and unsubstantiated for there are no momentos, notes, pictures, and love letters presented. Marinel also denied the alleged love relationship on direct cross-examination. Besides, the sweethearts defense cannot also rule out rape and even if it were true, the relationship does not, by itself, establish consent for love is not a license for lust.

The appellant’s claim that Marinel has bigger physique than him and could have resited and overcome his advances or could have shouted for help since her siblings and parents were nearby is also untenable. The time the rape incidents occurred, Marinel was still 13 years old thus she cannot be expected to put up a resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Marinel also testified that she was not of bigger built than the appellant at the time of the incident although she looked bigger than the appellant at the time she testified after the incidents two years ago. Moreover, Marinel’s failure to offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts.

The presence of force, threats and intimidation during the two rape incidents was also clearly established by the testimony of Marinel during the cross-examination.

The SC therefore denied the appeal and affirmed CA’s decision dated October 26, 2005 modifying the December 23, 2002 Judgment of the RTC of Camarines Sur.

PEOPLE vs ERROJO G.R. No. 102077 January 4, 2004

PEOPLE vs ERROJO

G.R. No. 102077

January 4, 2004

FACTS: Around 6:00 PM of March 5, 1989, the 14-year-old Anita Arabia, herein complainant, was wlaking alone on a pathway in Brgy. Cudian, Ivisan, Capiz on her way home from her sister’s house when a man collared her from behind. She looked back and recognized the man as the accused, Norberto Errojo.

The accused poked the complainant with a knife and held her by the neck and without saying a word, he pushed Arabia towards a forested area. Arabia, asked Errojo what he wanted from her but he just kep silent and continued to push her with a knife poked against her neck. Errojo then held Arabia by the shoulders and turned her body towards him and pushed her to the ground.

Errojo took off his pants and Arabia’s shorts and underwear with his right hand still thrusting the knife at the complainant’s neck. He warned her not to move and then went on top of her, inserted his organ into hers, and consummated the sexual act. Errojo repeated the coitus consuming more or less the same period as the first time. Thereafter, Errojo, before leaving, threatened Arabia that he will kill her and her brothers if she will tell her parents about the incident.

Arabia then wiped her private parts with her underwear and noticed blood in it. Nevertheless, she put it on together with her shorts and went home. When asked by her mother why she was late, Arabia lied by telling her that her sister asked her to watched their store. She then went to the comfort room, washed herself and went to sleep.

On March 12, 1989, a week after the incident, around 6:00PM, Errojo again accosted Arabia on her way home after bringing the laundry of her sister. He again succeeded in raping Arabia twice at the point of a knife and warned the complainant not to tell the incidents to her parents or brothers.

On November 16, 1989, Arabia submitted herself to a medical examination for she intended to take an advance officer’s course in the Citizen’s Military Training (CMT) of their school. Dr. Mariano Alovera, resident physician of the Roxas Memorial Hospital then discovered and informed her that she was in an advance state of preganancy being already 8 months in the family way. This is the time she disclosed to her mother the sexual assaults of Errojo upon her person on March 5 and 12, 1989. Arabia gave birth to a baby boy on December 11, 1989, whom she named Amor John Arabia.

The accused, Errojo, claimed on the other hand that on March 5, 1989 he worked with 4 other companions repairing the main gate of Crisanto Bista’s fishpond at Brgy. Cabugao from 7:00AM and went home at around 8:00PM. On March 12, he claimed that around 5:00PM, he and his son fetched water from a public faucet near the house of Crisanto Bista. Crisanto Bista corroborated Errojo’s testimony that on March 5, he had the main gate of his fishpond repaired by the accused and 4 other men from 6:00AM and invited the workers to have dinner at his house. He also testified that on March 12, he stayed at home and saw Errojo with his son fetch water from the faucet near his house at around 6:00PM.

ISSUES:    a. Whether or not employing not enough force that the law requires amounts to consent of the sexual assault.

       b. Whether or not the delay of making a criminal accusation impairs the credibility of the witness.

RULING: a. No. The SC sustained the trial court’s decision that force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible. What is necessary is that the force employed is sufficient to consummate the purpose of the offender or to bring about the result. The force and violence needed in rape is naturally relative and depends on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other.

In the case at bar, the court finds that the 14-year-old complainant is no match with the 41-year-old accused-appellant. The force and strength of the accused-appellant would have easily overcome any resistance that the complainant could have put up. Moreover, the assault was committed with a deadly knife, the sight of which would have necessarily evoked fear in the complainant. Hence, it is understandable if she easily succumbed to the sexual intrusion.

b. No. It has been held that the delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.

The complainant’s failure, in the case at bar, to disclose the outrage on her person including to her parents is also due to the threats on her life and her brothers. One cannot also expect a 14-year-old girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she was sexually assaulted. Moreover, she would not have filed the rape charges if she had not become pregnant. The Court has taken judicial cognizance that many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against their rapists and prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to the world and risk their rapist’s threats.

The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the trial court dated June 28, 1991 convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of rape.

People vs. Fabro G.R. No. 95089 August 11, 1997 (277 SCRA 19)

People vs. Fabro

G.R. No. 95089

August 11, 1997

FACTS: Sometime in the 2^nd week of April 1987, a strike was held by workers on the premises of the Casa Blanca, located at Barrio Baretto, Olongapo City, which the victim, Dionisio Joaquin was one of the organizers. Joaquin sought the assistance of his friends among whome was Anthony Beck, a stevedore and resident of Olongapo City.

At about 6:00 P.M. on April 11, 1987, Joaquin and Beck were at Whisky Bar fronting the Casa Blanca, at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City.  They were conversing while resting at the veranda of said Whisky Bar, fronting the Casa Blanca where a picket was being conducted by their co-strikers.   Both had fallen asleep, as they lacked sleep the previous nights, on a chair near each other with their feet resting on the veranda railings.

Anthony Beck fell asleep at about 4:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 12, 1987.  Shortly thereafter, at about 5:00 to 5:30 in the morning, he was awakened by gun report.  Opening his eyes, he saw Joaquin dead, with a single bullet wound on the forehead.  Blood was oozing from Joaquin's head.  Seeing a man running away from where he and Joaquin were seated, Anthony Beck then gave chase.  The fleeing man turned left on an alley and then right on another.  Beck lost him at the second turn.  He saw an old man who inquired why he was chasing the fleeing man.  Beck told the old man of the shooting incident.  Then and there the old man told Beck that the man he (Beck) was running after was “Badong,” later identified as the accused Nicomedes.

Police officers from the Olongapo Metrodiscom, led by Sgt. Felipe Bolina, proceeded to Fabro's residence at about noon that same day.  They failed to apprehend Fabro as he was allegedly then asleep.  The accused (Fabro) was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day.

At 6:00 o'clock that night, April 13, 1987, Fabro was interrogated by CIS personnel and grilled for about two (2) hours.  At that juncture, CIS investigator Santiago requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out to be his extra-judicial confession/admission.  Accused Fabro (claims that he) was not allowed to read the document, neither were its contents read to him. A certain Atty. Isagani Jungco was however present when he signed the document.

While it appears from the transcript that co-accused Francisco Dimalanta executed an extra-judicial statement (confession), Dimalanta himself was never presented in court as defense witness, as both accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during trial.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not the confession is admissible.

        b. Whether or not there is doubt in the identity of the     

           assailant.

        c. Whether or not the evidence is a hearsay.

        d. Whether or not there are conspiracy and treachery.

RULINGS: a. Jurisprudence defines confession as a a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. However, before such confession shall be admitted as evidence, it must satisfy the several requirements provided in Sec. 12 and 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. When all these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused.

In the case at bar, Fabro miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove that there was indeed force and intimidation on his person in order to secure his confession. The records show that appellant’s confession was sworn and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should have voiced his objection, if any.  Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante certified that he personally examined appellant and was convinced that the latter gave his statement freely and voluntarily and that he understood the contents of his confession.  Appellant’s failure to voice out his complaints is tantamount to a manifestation that indeed he waived his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Jungco in accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, the court finds Fabro’s lack of complaint or even any mention thereof to his sister and relatives who visited him at Camp Maquinaya where he was detained for one year further belies his claim which reinforces the trial court’s ruling. Aboveall, the court was convinced that the confession was voluntary because Fabro was able to tell that the confession contains exculpatory claims and facts which that only he could have known.

b. The SC is not persuaded by Fabro’s argument that Beck could not have seen the face of the person running away from the crime scene because it was dark and he had just awakened and it would take some time for his eyes to adjust. The court gives more weight on the witness’ testimony that he was able to see the Fabro’s face although he was not able to catch up with him, which in the open court he identified Fabro as the man he was chasing.

Against Fabro’s confession, the denial is actually a belated retraction of the said confession. The rule of the court is that repudiation and recantation of confessions which have been obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable and have negligible probative weight.

c. The SC did not sustain Fabro’s claim that the identification was hearsay because his name was allegedly given to Beck by a Eduardo Ragonton who was not presented as witness for Beck was still able to identify Fabro in an open court because he was able to see his face during that fateful night. Fabro’s name may be considered hearsay for it was supplied by another person however the witness however knew the identity of the appellant.

d. The SC finds the conspiracy of Fabro and his co-accused unquestionable and sustained the trial court’s ruling on the said issue. The SC upheld that the acts of the accused show that they were animated by the same purpose and were united in their execution.  When, by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object -- each doing a part so that their acts though apparently independent were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment -- conspiracy may be inferred.

From Fabro’s confession, it is clear that Dimalanta offered him money to kill Joaquin and that together with Alcala they observed the movements of the victim; that prior to the shooting, they had attempted to kill the victim at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of the shooting, on April 12, 1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene of the crime, acting as lookouts and awaiting the outcome of the killing.

Treachery is shown by the fact that appellant, after several days of observing the movements of the victim, shot the latter while he was asleep. The means of execution (1) gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) showed that such method was deliberately or consciously adopted.

The Supreme Court thus affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court with slight modification – changing penalty to reclusion perpetua after offsetting one egenric aggravating circumstance with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and increasing the indemnity to 50, 000.00 PhP.